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Case Comments
Justice Douglas' Sanctuary: May Churches*
Be Excluded From Suburban Residential Areas?
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. This goal is
a permissible one .... [The police power] is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area
a sanctuary for people.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Douglas' statement in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas2 has been invoked
frequently since 1974 to support the legitimacy of single-family residential districts in
municipalities. Heartened by this unambiguous statement by the United States Su-
preme Court, municipalities have exercised their police power to prohibit certain
property uses and users in order to preserve the quality of their residential
neighborhoods. 3 Even before the Belle Terre decision, Lakewood, Ohio, an older,
suburban community in the metropolitan Cleveland area, used zoning to protect the
quality of its residential districts. 4 In 1973 Lakewood enacted a new zoning code,
which prohibited the construction of churches in one- or two-family residential dis-
tricts or in multiple family, low density districts. 5 In Lakewood, Ohio Congregation
of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City ofLakewood,6 a case of first impression in the federal
courts, the Sixth Circuit upheld the validity of the 1973 zoning ordinance, concluding
that it was not a violation of either the free exercise clause of the first amendment 7 or
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 8
The Lakewood case grew out of events commencing in 19729 when members of
the Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of the Jehovah's WitnessesO sought to relocate
* Throughout this article the term "churches" includes any structure used by a religious organization primarily
for worship.
I. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
2. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
3. Although municipalities may prohibit uses directly, they also indirectly may exclude uses by height, bulk, and
area requirements. 2 R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING §§ 9.50-.67 (2d ed. 1976). Users may be indirectly
excluded by minimum lot area or floor area, density restrictions, and the prohibition of certain types of dwellings (e.g.,
mobile homes, rowhouses and multiple family houses). Id. §§ 8.04-.1 I.
4. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303,304 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
5. Id. at 305 (referring to LAKEWOOD, OHIO ORDINANCE § 55-78 (July 2, 1973)).
6. 699 F.2d 303, 304 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983). The Lakewood decision has prompted
considerable discussion. See generally, Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLuM. L. REV.
1562 (1984); Comment, Zoning Ordinances Affecting Churches: A Proposal for Expanded Free Exercise Protection, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 1131 (1984).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
9. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
10. Hereinafter referred to as the "Congregation."
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because their existing facilities were inadequate. The Congregation found a suitable
location in Lakewood on the comer of Clifton Boulevard, a six-lane thoroughfare,
and West Clifton Avenue, a secondary artery." The half-acre lot was located in an
area zoned for single-family dwellings, 2 subject to a special-use permit13 for
churches.' 4 The city zoning board of appeals denied the Congregation's request for a
special-use permit, citing potentially increased traffic hazards and noise levels,
potentially decreased property values, and "various other problems." ' 15 The Con-
gregation unsuccessfully appealed the denial of the special-use permit to the Cuyaho-
ga County Court of Common Pleas.1 6 Soon thereafter, Lakewood enacted the 1973
zoning ordinance, which explicitly prohibited the construction of a church building
on the lot that the Congregation had procured. 17 In fact, the ordinance prohibited new
churches in ninety percent of the suburban city, while in nine of the remaining ten
percent,18 a special-use permit was required for the construction of a church.' 9 Since
Lakewood was suburban and had little undeveloped land, the Congregation had to
compete with businesses for the few open parcels of land in the remaining ten
percent. The competition resulted in a premium on commercial land, which proved to
be prohibitive for the Congregation.20
Unable to locate other affordable and suitable sites, the Congregation again
sought a building permit for the acquired lot.2 1 The permit again was denied, this
time based on the newly enacted zoning ordinance. The Congregation then filed suit
in federal district court, under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act2 2 arguing that the
11. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 304 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
12. Id. at 305.
13. Special-uses are permitted subject to certain conditions specified in the zoning regulations. If the appropriate
administrative agency determines that the conditions have been met, a use will be permitted. 3 R. ANDERSON, supra note
3, at § 19.01.
14. Brief for Appellant at 10, Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses 699 F.2d 303, (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
15. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
16. The Congregation actually filed two state claims. The first suit alleged the special-use permit was improperly
denied. The second suit, filed in 1975, concerned the validity of LAKEWOOD, OHIo ORDiNANCE § 55-78 (July 2, 1973)
under both the state and federal constitutions. The Congregation lost in Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court,
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 9 Ohio Op. 3d 314 (C.P. 1978), and
appealed to the Eighth District Court of Appeals of Ohio. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision but
remanded the case to determine the constitutionality of the ordinance as applied. The common pleas court had not made a
determination on this issue when the Congregation filed the federal suit. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's
Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
17. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
18. Id. at 307.
19. Brief for Appellant at 13, Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d
303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
20. Id. at 31.
21. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
22. Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or
Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
1018
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Lakewood zoning ordinance violated the Congregation members' first, fifth, and
fourteenth amendment rights.23 When the district court held the zoning ordinance was
valid, the Congregation appealed the first amendment claim to the Sixth Circuit.24
Applying the Wisconsin v. Yoder test,' the Sixth Circuit rejected the first
amendment argument. The court concluded that the first element of the test, whether
the religious activity is a fundamental teilet of one's religion,26 was not satisfied,
because building a church has no religious significance.27 Furthermore, the second
element, whether the state unduly burdens the religious practice, 28 was not satisfied
since the burden on the Congregation was minimal; the Congregation still could
worship in homes, churches, schools, or meeting halls in residential districts.
29
Moreover, the court stated that financial inability to purchase land in a permitted zone
was only an indirect economic burden, which does not require a court remedy. Since
the court found the Congregation failed to satisfy the first two elements of Yoder,
30
the burden did not shift to the city to show a compelling state interest, the third
element of the Yoder test.31 The Sixth Circuit also discussed whether the Congrega-
tion was denied due process under the fourteenth amendment. The court concluded
that the Congregation was not denied due process since Lakewood had a rational
basis32 for prohibiting churches in residential districts under Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.3 3 and Belle Terre. The Congregation's petition for a writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied.
34
The circumstances of the Lakewood case are fairly typical of situations across
the United States. Suburban communities are becoming increasingly aggressive in the
use of their most powerful discretionary tool, zoning. 35 Restrictive residential zoning
has a direct impact on excluded property uses since these uses are restricted to other
portions of the city or excluded totally. For religious minorities, the prohibition of
proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1983 to include a municipal corporation as a "person."
Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 993 (1980).
23. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 304 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
24. The Congregation did not appeal the other two constitutional claims. Id.
25. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see infra text accompanying notes 136-38.
26. Id. at 216.
27. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303,307 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
28. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
29. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
30. Id. at 308.
31. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
32. The rational basis test when applied to zoning ordinances, means that an appellate court will not second guess the
municipality's legislative body concerning the wisdom or rationality of the zoning ordinance, if the ordinance has a
"substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare." Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
33. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
34. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
35. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) ("The power of local governments to zone
and control land use is undoubtedly broad and its proper exercise is an essential aspect of achieving a satisfactory quality
of life in both urban and rural communities.").
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new churches in residential districts presents a dilemma, since these minorities often
have neither the political power to change the ordinance nor the economic resources
to purchase suitable property in a permitted district. A church, then, is straightjack-
eted; it is unable to grow and worship with its new adherents. It may be forced to go
outside of the community, subjected to other communities' zoning restrictions, and
removed from the congregation and community it was established to serve. The
Lakewood case provides an excellent basis for a reexamination whether, given the
increasing judicial deference to zoning decisions, a municipality validly can exclude
churches from residential areas. This Comment will demonstrate that the free ex-
ercise clause is a valid basis upon which to declare unconstitutional the prohibition of
the construction of churches in residential areas in situations such as those in Lake-
wood. Furthermore, this Comment will demonstrate that the establishment clause
would not be violated by permitting churches in residential districts.
II. THE HISTORY OF ZONING AND ITS EFFECT ON RELIGIOUS USES
A. Historical Basis for Zoning
Zoning is a fairly recent concept. During the nineteenth century, restrictive
covenants 36 and the doctrine of nuisance37 were widely used to resolve conflicts
between differing uses of land. 38 These approaches generally were dependent upon
enforcement by adjoining landowners and consequently were a piecemeal approach
to remedying harms. 39 Zoning, the regulation of private uses of land by a municipal-
ity through its police power, provided not only governmental enforcement of re-
stricted uses but also a comprehensive approach to problems that could not be solved
individually. 40 In 1926, in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 4 1 the United
States Supreme Court first determined the validity of zoning. The Court concluded
that a municipality has the power to regulate land use to promote the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare. 42 Although municipalities legally could restrict
land use, any provision that is "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare," is un-
constitutional. 43 Two years later the Court reiterated this standard in Nectow v. City
of Cambridge." After Nectow, the Court declined to hear zoning cases for almost
forty years, preferring to let state courts consider these cases of local concern.
Although state courts have honored the standard set forth in Euclid and Nectow, those
courts have interpreted the standard differently and have created a continuum of
36. A restrictive covenant is a provision in a deed which limits certain uses or prohibits them altogether. I R.
ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 3.04.
37. Nuisance is a wrongful act that interferes with or destroys another's use or enjoyment of his or her land. Id.
§ 3.03.
38. 82 AM. JUR. 2D, Zoning and Planning § 1 (1976).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
42. Id. at 395.
43. Id.
44. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
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review, ranging from substantial deference4 5 to close scrutiny of legislative de-
cisions.4
6
In the last ten years, the Supreme Court has returned to reviewing zoning laws.47
The Court, still clinging to the standard articulated in Euclid and Nectow, has shown
almost complete deference to legislative determinations on social and economic regu-
lation including zoning.4" The Court, however, has begun to consider the limitations
of zoning, especially when it conflicts with fundamental rights.4 9 Still, prior to
Lakewood, there were no reported federal decisions concerning the conflict between
zoning and the religion clauses. This left the issue to the state courts. 50
B. The Use of Zoning to Exclude Churches in Residential Areas
Even before the courts became deferential to zoning decisions, communities
excluded certain uses from residential areas. The most common exclusions were
commercial and industrial uses51 and apartment buildings. 52 Justice Sutherland wrote
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. that apartment buildings have the character-
istics of a nuisance and, therefore, could be excluded from single-family residential
districts. 53 Other property uses, such as churches, schools, libraries, and other public
buildings, were not as clearly objectionable, but the Euclid Court failed to rule on
them: "Specifically, there is nothing in the record to suggest that any damage results
from the presence in the ordinance of those restrictions relating to churches, schools,
libraries and other public and semi-public buildings." 5 4
Many municipalities, however, have found that churches and their parishioners
produce undesirable effects and, therefore, use zoning to control religious uses of
45. See, e.g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 202 P.2d 38, 42, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 939
(1949) (holding that zoning decisions will not be invalidated unless the regulations have no reasonable relation to the
public welfare).
46. See, e.g., La Salle Nat'l. Bank v. City of Chicago, 5 Il1. 2d 344, 354, 125 N.E.2d 609, 614 (1955) (holding that
zoning decisions will not be invalidated unless the regulations have no real and substantial relation to the public welfare).
47. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (invalidating a zoning ordinance that prohibited
live nude dancing in the community); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (holding that a zoning
ordinance that prohibited a grandmother from living with her grandson defined family too narrowly in violation of the due
process clause); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding a zoning ordinance that dispersed
adult theatres throughout the community); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a zoning
ordinance that prohibited more than two unrelated or unmarried persons from living in the same dwelling).
48. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("When local economic regulation is challenged
solely as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court consistently defers to legislative determinations as to the
desirability of particular statutory discriminations."); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) ("We deal
with economic and social legislation where legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect against the charge
of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary'...."). But see United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those
of the first ten amendments ....").
49. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977) ("When a city undertakes such intrusive regulation
of the family, neither Belle Terre nor Euclid governs; The usual judicial deference to the legislature is inappropriate.").
50. See, e.g., Galfas v. City of Atlanta, 193 F.2d 931 (5th Cir. 1952). In Galfas the court applied the abstention
doctrine. This doctrine gives a federal court discretionary authority to relinquish jurisdiction when the matter concerns an
issue that the state court would be better suited to handle. Railroad Comm'n. of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941).
51. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, §§ 9.25-.26.
52. Id. § 9.35.
53. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
54. Id. at 385.
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land.5 5 The most significant problem created by churches is traffic hazards.56 When
groups congregate, traffic and traffic hazards necessarily result. This is a particular
concern in residential areas, where roads are narrower than in other areas of the
municipality and cannot handle a sudden influx of automobiles before or after
religious services. 57 The hazards are compounded when the worshippers park along
narrow residential streets. Communities also are concerned because the safety of
children is threatened when traffic increases. A second problem is the noise created
by a church and its parishioners.5 8 Noise can come not only from inside the church
(especially during the summer) but also from outside the church during outdoor
activities of the congregation and during the time before and after worship services.
59
A third, but more questionable concern is economics. Churches are exempt from
property taxes and thus decrease tax revenues for municipalities. 60 Moreover, the
mere presence of a church may decrease the value of surrounding land.6 1 Finally,
municipalities may wish to discourage undesirable religious sects from worshipping
in the community although this concern is never explicitly stated. 62 While this goal is
not a legitimate objective of zoning, 63 municipalities legitimately are able to regulate
religious uses to remedy the first three problems, under such a broad standard of
regulating "health, safety, morals, and general welfare," that they are able to rem-
edy the last concern as well. 64
1. Judicial Rejection of the Use of Zoning to Exclude Churches
Even though many of the municipalities' concerns are legitimate, most state
courts have rejected municipalities' attempts to exclude churches from residential
districts, 65 and commentators have supported this result.66 The state courts could
have upheld the municipalities' actions under the Euclid test by finding a relationship
55. See generally Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (the Court held that a city council may use
zoning to regulate adult theatres in order to reduce the ill effects caused by those establishments).
56. J. CURRY, PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF LAND 118-34 (1964); 3 N. WILLtAMS, JR., AME-
ICAN LAND PLANNING § 77.12 (1975).
57. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 12.22.
58. J. CURRY, supra note 56, at 106-10.
59. Id. at 106.
60. Id. at 89-94.
61. Id. at 95-104.
62. Id. at 186-208. It is noteworthy that most of the cases litigated concern Moslems, Jews, Jehovah's Witnesses,
and Christian fundamentalist groups, since these religious minorities have been subject to religious discrimination in the
past. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 133 (1971). For a recent example of
neighbors' attempt at removing an undesirable religious sect, see Baptist Neighbors Oppose Texas Buddhist Temple, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1984, at AS, col. 2.
63. See generally Buchanan v. Watley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding that a city ordinance that had the practical
effect of fostering racial discrimination was invalid).
64. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 8.19.
65. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 117 N.E.2d 115
(1954); Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 53 N.W.2d 308 (1952); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning
Bd. of Brighton, I N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1956); Ohio ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United
Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942); City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115,
183 S.W.2d 415 (1944). Massachusetts has legislatively prohibited municipalities from regulating or restricting the use of
land for religious purposes. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 40A § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1983).
66. Note, Churches and Zoning, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1428 (1957); Note, Zoning Out Religious Institutions, 32 No-TR
DAME LAW. 627 (1957); Note, Zoning Laws and the Church, 27 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 93 (1952).
1984] RESIDENTIAL ZONING THAT EXCLUDES CHURCHES 1023
between the traffic and noise created by churches and the public "health, safety,
S.. and general welfare. "67 Instead, these courts used a modified form of the Euclid
test68 and possibly considered unvoiced religious discrimination underlying the
facts 69 to reject municipalities' attempts to exclude churches.
The courts have modified the Euclid test in two ways. First, the courts have held
that a church has a special status that must prevail when a zoning ordinance conflicts
with a church's desire to locate within the community. 70 Second, since churches
promote morals and general welfare, the courts have found that using the police
power to exclude churches would be arbitrary and unreasonable. 7'
In Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor,72 for ex-
ample, the New York Court of Appeals stated that "the peculiarly pre-eminent status
of religious institutions under the first amendment provision for free exercise of
religion remains an important factor entering into the balance that also weighs the
needs or desires of the community." 73 In an earlier opinion, the same court said that
"when the church enters the picture, different considerations apply." 74 Although the
Roslyn Harbor court found the preeminence of religious institutions was derived from
the first amendment, the court failed to provide any justification for its conclusion.
Other courts have also found in the constitutional right to worship and to assemble for
worship the justification for invalidating zoning ordinances. 75 However, these courts
also never explained how those rights are infringed when a congregation is prohibited
from building a church.
This lack of analysis probably is due to the state courts' inability to find any
67. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
68. One court has stressed the necessity of modifying the Euclid test:
Human experience teaches us that public officials, when faced with pressure to bar church uses by those
residing in a residential neighborhood, tend to avoid any appearance of an antireligious stance and temper their
decision by carefully couching their grounds for refusal to permit such use in terms of traffic dangers, fire
hazards and noise and disturbance.... Under such circumstances it is necessary to most carefully scrutinize the
reasons advanced for a denial to insure that they are real and not merely pretexts used to preclude the exercise of
constitutionally protected privileges.
American Friends of Soc'y of St. Pius v. Schwab, 68 A.D.2d 646, 417 N.Y.S. N.Y.S.2d 991 (1979).
69. J. CuRRY, supra note 56, at 186. Curry isolates seven elements that he believes are indicative of religious
prejudice:
A. A sharp difference in the treatment of two denominations under comparable circumstances.
B. Procedural harassment of an applicant.
C. Sudden changes in requirements, imposed when a particular church application is about to be filed or
just after it is filed.
D. Harsh language or other indication of a hostile attitude.
E. Absence of a rational basis for a decision against the church.
F. Truculence on the part of the church-applicant that would try the patience of angels.
G. Adverse action against a church or racial group which is notoriously the victim of widespread in-
tolerance.
Id. at 187.
70. See, e.g., Jewish Reconstructionist Synagogue v. Village of Roslyn Harbor, 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534,
379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
71. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39
N.E.2d 515 (1942).
72. 38 N.Y.2d 283, 342 N.E.2d 534, 379 N.Y.S.2d 747 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976).
73. Id. at 288, 342 N.E.2d at 538, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 753.
74. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 523, 136 N.E.2d 827, 834, 154 N.Y.S.2d
849, 859 (1956).
75. See, e.g., Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 94, 117 N.E.2d
115, 128 (1954).
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basis for the Supreme Court's limited interpretation of the free exercise clause. 76
Until the 1963 Sherbert v. Verner decision, 77 religious activity was not considered
within the purview of the free exercise clause. Even after Sherbert building a church
arguably could not be considered a religious activity.78 Furthermore, the courts
feared that a preference for religious uses might require similar preferences for other
forms of public assembly. 9
The difficulty in finding justification for the protection of religious uses of land
in the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, and the desire to protect the
rights of churchgoers caused some courts to determine that a zoning ordinance pro-
hibiting churches was contrary to the goals that a state's police power was intended to
promote.80 Churches, several courts declared, actually promote morals and general
welfare. Churches not only provide stability by teaching moral values 8' but also
provide community services and a place for social groups to meet.
82
After considering the benefits that churches provide to a community, these
courts concluded that any detriments were insignificant. Most courts have determined
that although traffic hazards posed the greatest threat, the threats were minimal since
churches created the most traffic in nonpeak hours.8 3 In determining the gravity of the
hazard, the courts have looked at the number of worshippers, 84 the width of the
street, 85 and the availability of on-site parking.86 One court even concluded that
people entering the street upon leaving a church rarely cause accidents. 87 In addition,
courts have stated that noise created by churches is "insufficient grounds upon which
to deny a permit to a church.' 88 The Ohio Supreme Court, for instance, claimed that
76. See infra text accompanying notes 108-123.
77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
78. Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1955).
79. J. CURY, supra note 56, at 210.
80. Id.
81. Mooney v. Village of Orchard Lake, 333 Mich. 389, 394, 53 N.W.2d 308, 310 (1952) (citing the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787); Ohio exr el. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 248-49,
39 N.E.2d 515,524 (1942) ("The Church in our American society has traditionally occupied the role of both teacher and
guardian of morals.").
82, Ohio ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 249, 39 N.E.2d
515, 524 (1942) ("Fully to accomplish its ... social function, the church should be integrated into the home life of the
community which it serves.").
83. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 93, 117 N.E.2d 115, 120
(1954) ("The services ... are held ... at times when traffic is at its lowest ebb."); Ohio er rel. Synod of Ohio of
United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 248, 39 N.E.2d 515,524 (1942) ("Any perceptible increase
in traffic ... would occur ... [at] a time when ordinary traffic would be greatly diminished .... ").
84. Galfas v. Ailor, 81 Ga. App. 13, 57 S.E.2d 834, 835, transf., 206 Ga. 76, 55 S.E.2d 582 (1950) (175
members); Ohio ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515
(1942) (250 members).
85. Ohio ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 248, 39 N.E.2d
515, 524 (1942) (one of the streets was "as wide as any in the city"); Washington ex rel. Wenatchee Congregation of
Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Wenatchee, 50 Wash. 2d 378, 312 P.2d 195 (1957) (50-60 feet); West Virginia ex rel.
Howell v. Meader, 109 W. Va. 368, 154 S.E. 876 (1930) (35 feet).
86. Ohio ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515
(1942) (area sufficient to accommodate 60 automobiles).
87. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 92, 117 N.E.2d 115, 120
(1954).
88. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, I N.Y.2d 508, 525, 136 N.E.2d 827, 836, 154 N.Y.S.2d
849, 861 (1956); accord Ohio ex rel. of Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229,
247, 39 N.E.2d 515, 523 (1942); Congregation Comm., N. Fort Worth Congregation, Jehovah's Witnesses v. City
Council of Haltom City, 287 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
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churchgoers rarely enter the church in a boisterous mood. 89 Finally, state courts have
held that a decrease in property values is not a harm that justifies excluding
churches,90 especially since any harm is either speculative or negligible. 9 1 Thus, the
state courts have balanced the churches' potential harms to the community against the
benefits of churches, and have concluded that zoning ordinances excluding churches
are arbitrary and unreasonable, since the ordinances are not substantially related to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
92
2. Judicial Acceptance of Exclusion of Religious Uses of
Land from Residential Districts
While in a majority of states, churches could not be excluded from residential
districts, courts in four states, California,93 Connecticut,94 Florida,95 and Oregon,96
have held that churches may be excluded from residential districts through zoning. In
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
City of Porterville,97 for example, a California court decided that zoning does not
constitute an unwarranted restriction of worship, and therefore, like any other land-
owner, the plaintiff-church was subject to land use restrictions.98 In Milwaukie Com-
pany of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen99 the Oregon Supreme Court explicitly stated
its rationale for holding that churches legally could be excluded from residential
districts. The court said that although freedom of religion cannot be suppressed, one's
religious practice is subject to valid governmental regulations.' 0 0 Conse-
89. Ohio ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 247, 39 N.E.2d
515, 523 (1942).
90. Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 384, 362 P.2d 172, 177 (1961) (McWilliams, J.,
specially concurring) ("The possible depressive effect on property values ... is not in itself sufficient ground .... ");
Columbus Park Congregation v. Board of Appeals, 25 111. 2d 65, 73, 182 N.E.2d 722, 726 (1962) (permitted uses in the
district are just as harmful to property value as the establishment of a church); Board of Zoning Appeals v. Schultz, 241
Ind. 339, 348, 172 N.E.2d 39, 43 (1961); Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. of Brighton, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 524, 136
N.E.2d 827, 835, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 861 (1956) ("[A] mere pecuniary loss to a few persons should not bar" the erection
of a church.); Congregation Comm., N. Fort Worth Congregation, Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council of Haltom City,
287 S.W.2d 700, 705 (rex. Civ. App. 1956) ("The evidence falls far short of showing material injury to neighboring
residential property.").
91. See, e.g., Congregation Comm., N. Fort Worth Congregation, Jehovah's Witnesses v. City Council of Haltom
City, 287 S.W.2d 700, 705 (rex. Civ. App. 1956).
92. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
93. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal.
App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal denied, 338 U.S. 805 (1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 939 (1950).
94. West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of West Hartford, 143 Conn. 263, 121 A.2d 640
(1956).
95. Miami Beach United Lutheran Church of the Epiphany v. City of Miami Beach, 82 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1955).
Contra State ex rel. Tampa, Florida Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, N. Unit v. City of Tampa, 48 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1950).
96. Milwaukie Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 214 Or. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958), cert. denied and appeal
dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
97. 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823, appeal denied, 338 U.S. 805 (1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 939 (1950).
The Porterville decision was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds: "We
recently dismissed for want of substantiality an appeal in which a church group contended that its First Amendment rights
were violated by a municipal zoning ordinance preventing the building of churches in certain residential areas." 339 U.S.
382, 397-98 (1950).
98. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 90 Cal.
App. 2d 656, 660, 203 P.2d 823, 825, appeal denied, 338 U.S. 805 (1949), reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 939 (1950).
99. 214 Or. 281, 330 P.2d 5 (1958), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
100. Id. at 319, 330 P.2d at 23.
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quently, the Mullen court strictly applied the Euclid standard of review to the con-
tested zoning ordinance and upheld the ordinance because the reduction of traffic
hazards and noise were valid zoning goals.' 0 1
The idea that zoning legitimately can be used to exclude churches is still a
minority view, but this view is becoming increasingly accepted, as a result of grow-
ing judicial deference to zoning ordinances. In 1982, for example, the Alaska Su-
preme Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited the establishment of a paroch-
ial school in a residential district.10 2 In an even more intrusive ruling, the New Jersey
Superior Court held that a municipality validly could prohibit a congregation from
worshipping in the minister's home.' 0 3 In Lakewood, the Jehovah's Witnesses were
unsuccessful in their state claim for a special-use permit 10 4 even though the Ohio
Supreme Court already had held that excluding churches from residential areas was
arbitrary and unreasonable. 105 The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that "while the
law of Ohio provides that churches may be erected in single family districts, this does
not mean that churches have an absolute right to erect their buildings on any lot in a
single family district. The city may require reasonable restrictions."' 1 6 The appellate
court, therefore, affirmed the denial of the special-use permit.
10 7
The foregoing decisions indicate that state courts are becoming increasingly
reluctant to review legislative decisions that prohibit religious uses in residential
districts. Consequently, religious minorities' interest in worshipping in the communi-
ty in which their members live may not receive adequate judicial protection.
III. PROTECTION OF THE LOCATION OF CHURCHES
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Free Exercise Clause and Religious Activity
In 1791, the free exercise clause of the first amendment 0 8 was added to the
United States Constitution to protect the rights of religious minorities.' 0 9 Although
the free exercise clause was added to the Constitution early in United States history,
the scope of the clause's protection has been unclear. Not only does no legislative
101. Id. at 313, 330 P.2d at 20.
102. Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982).
103. New Jersey v. Cameron, 184 N.J. Super. 66, 445 A.2d 75 (Law Div. 1982), affd, 189 N.J. Super. 404, 460
A.2d 191 (App. Div. 1983); see also Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729 (1Ith Cir. 1983); Comment, Zoning
Ordinances, Private Religious Conduct, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 76 Nw. U.L. Rv. 786, 786-812 (1981).
104. See supra note 16.
105. Ohio ex rel. Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran Church in Am. v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515
(1942).
106. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, No. 32386, slip op. at 4 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 21, 1974).
107. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 305 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
108. U.S. CONsr. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise of [religion] ... .
109. The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and to establish them as legal principles
to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome
of no elections.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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history exist to elucidate the framers' intent, but the Supreme Court did not first
construe the clause until 1879, eighty-eight years after its ratification. In Reynolds v.
United States 11 the Supreme Court declared that the federal government could out-
law the Mormons' practice of polygamy. The Court held that although the govern-
ment could not regulate religious beliefs, regulation of religious actions was within
the government's scope of power."' This action/belief dichotomy continued in later
Supreme Court cases in which the Court held that the government could prohibit
children from soliciting religious tracts 1 2 and that the government could require
children to be innoculated in violation of a religious doctrine. 1 3 In Cantwell v.
Connecticut"4 the Court also made the free exercise clause applicable to the states.
The Court noted that a statute that regulated the dissemination of religious ideas
would be ruled invalid if it were not narrowly drawn to limit the discretion of the
public official. 115
Although the Court continued to follow the action/belief dichotomy, decisions
concerning constitutional rights of religion were often decided on alternative
grounds, 116 demonstrating the Court's reluctance to expand the meaning of the free
exercise clause. For example, the Court upheld the right of parents to send their
children to private and parochial schools as long as those schools satisfied the basic
educational requirements. " 7 The Court based its decision, however, on the liberty of
parents to direct the upbringing of their children, which was protected by the four-
teenth amendment.11 8 In West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 1'9 the Court
declared that children of the Jehovah's Witnesses could not be compelled to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance to the United States flag. Although it was against the Jehovah's
Witnesses' fundamental tenets to honor graven images like the flag, the Court
appeared to decide this case on free speech grounds.'
20
The Supreme Court did not decide a case concerning religious activity solely on
free exercise grounds until 1961 when in Braunfeld v. Brown121 the Court held that a
law requiring businesses to close on Sundays did not violate the free exercise clause.
Braunfeld asserted that the Sunday closing law forced him to choose between practic-
ing his religion, which required that he close his store on Saturday, and remaining
open on Saturday to compensate for the loss of income from closing on Sunday and to
110. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
111. Id. at 166.
112. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
113. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. H (1905).
114. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
115. Id. at 307.
116. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory salute to the American
flag violates the freedom of religion and of speech); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (a municipal
ordinance requiring a tax be paid by solicitors of religious literature violates the freedom of religion, speech, and press);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (dissemination of religious ideas is protected by the first amendment);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (prohibition of parochial schools within the state was a violation of due
process).
117. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
118. Id. at 534.
119. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
120. Id. at 642.
121. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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retain his capital investment. 122 Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, stated
that the Pennsylvania statute that prohibited businesses from remaining open on
Sunday did not require Orthodox Jews to forsake their religious beliefs; the statute
merely created an indirect burden that makes the practice of their religion more
expensive. The Court held that the statute did not discriminate invidiously among
religions and that the statute promoted a valid state interest-a uniform day of rest.
Therefore, the Court held that the statute did not violate the free exercise clause.
123
Two years later, in Sherbert v. Verner,'24 the Court expanded the protection of
religious activity. The Court rejected the action/belief distinction 125 and stated that
religious freedom is violated when a substantial burden is placed on the religious
practice126 without a compelling state interest.127 Sherbert dealt with a South Caro-
lina law that denied unemployment compensation to individuals who had refused to
accept work. 128 The plaintiff, Sherbert, had refused to accept any work that required
her to work on Saturday, her religion's day of rest.' 29 Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, stated that the South Carolina law forced Sherbert to choose between her
religious beliefs and accepting unemployment benefits, and, therefore, imposed a
substantial burden on her religious beliefs.' 30 Furthermore, the state had asserted no
compelling interest in requiring everyone to accept work on Saturdays. The Court
held that the state's interest could be met while allowing religious exemptions. 3 '
Justice Brennan distinguished Braunfeld, asserting that the state's interest in Braun-
feld in a uniform day of rest was compelling, while the state's interest in Sherbert,
uniform application of unemployment compensation laws, was not. Justice Brennan
concluded that providing a religious exemption in Braunfeld would "present an
administrative problem of such magnitude, or ... afford the exempted class so great
a competitive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered the entire
statutory scheme unworkable." 132 On the other hand, Justice Brennan found no such
problem in Sherbert; an exception to the statute would not render the goal of uniform
application of the unemployment compensation laws totally unworkable. 133
The free exercise clause was delineated further by Chief Justice Burger in
Wisconsin v. Yoder' 34 and in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment
Security Division.'3 5 In Yoder, the Court held that a state could not compel Amish
students to attend high school, since the state law conflicted with the Amish religious
practices. In reaching that conclusion, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
122. Id. at 601.
123. Id. at 609.
124. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
125. The Eleventh Circuit appears to have resurrected the actionfbelief dichotomy. See Grosz v. City of Miami
Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 733 n.5 (11th Cir. 1983).
126, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 401.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 404.
131. Id. at 407.
132. Id. at 408-09.
133. Id.
134. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
135. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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enunciated a three-part test: (1) whether the activity in question is rooted in genuine
religious belief;136 (2) whether the free exercise of that religion is unduly burdened by
governmental action;' 3 7 and (3) whether the state's interests are of "the highest
order," outweighing the petitioner's burden.'
38
In Thomas the Court further broadened the application of the free exercise
clause. Thomas argued that he was denied unemployment compensation because of
his religious beliefs. Thomas had been denied unemployment benefits because he had
refused to work on a production line making parts for armaments, even though as a
member of the Jehovah's Witnesses, he was not obligated to refuse to make
armaments.' 39 Although the Court in Yoder required the religious activity to be a
fundamental tenet of one's religion, the Thomas Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice
Burger, stated that "religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection." 140 Thus,
something less than an established church doctrine will be considered a religious
belief sufficient to satisfy the first element of the Yoder test, as long as the belief is
genuinely held by the individual. The Thomas Court reiterated the compelling state
interest or interest of the highest order standard found in Sherbert and Yoder and
concluded that the state had not met its burden.14
The Thomas decision is the most recent of several decisions broadening the
scope of the free exercise clause. These cases evidence the Court's attempt to scruti-
nize closely governmental actions that subtly discriminate against religious minorit-
ies. The Supreme Court's expansion of the free exercise clause to protect religious
minorities sharply contrasts with federal and state court decisions' 42 that have upheld
zoning ordinances that effectively exclude religious minorities from certain com-
munities.
B. Application of the Yoder Test to Lakewood Situations
1. Worship as Religious Activity Rooted in Genuine Religious Belief
The Yoder test arguably can be applied in the zoning context to protect the right
of a religious group to construct a place of worship in the group's chosen location.
While the Sixth Circuit in Lakewood denied protection under Yoder, concluding that
(1) a church building had no ritualistic significance, 143 (2) the burdens on the group's
religious practice were only aesthetic and economic, 44 and (3) zoning for safety
136. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
137, Id. at 218.
138. Id. at 215.
139. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 709-11 (1981).
140. Id. at 714.
141. Id. at 719.
142. Besides the Sixth Circuit, one other circuit, the Eleventh, has upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibits churches
or synagogues in residential districts. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 738 (11 th Cir. 1983). For state court
decisions, see text accompanying notes 92-95.
143. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
144. Id.
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reasons was a valid use of the police power, 14 5 the Sixth Circuit's analysis is in many
ways unsatisfactory. Although a church building merely may be the structure in
which the congregation worships, the regulation of land use for church building does
affect where a congregation can worship, and depending on the extent of the regula-
tion, whether the congregation can worship at all. 146 The right to worship is protected
under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.1 47 Thus, although a church
building itself may not have the ritualistic significance necessary to satisfy the "fun-
damental tenet of one's religion" 4 8 element of the Yoder test, the denial of the right
to construct a church as a means to effect the right to worship, may in effect deny a
congregation the right to worship. Since worship is constitutionally protected, the
first element of the Yoder test should be satisfied by a showing that the prohibition of
the construction of churches has a detrimental impact on the congregation's ability to
exercise its right to worship.
2. Exclusion from Residential Districts as an Undue Burden
The second element of the Yoder test, which must be satisfied to show a con-
stitutional violation, is that governmental action must unduly burden free exercise. ' 49
In Lakewood, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the zoning ordinance only indirectly
burdened the Jehovah's Witnesses' free exercise of religion and that an indirect
burden does not satisfy the second element of the Yoder test. The Supreme Court in
Sherbert, however, acknowledged that an indirect burden may have the same effect
as a direct burden. Quoting the language in Braunfeld v. Brown the Sherbert Court
said: "If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is con-
stitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only
indirect." 50 A municipality cannot enact a regulation prohibiting a certain religious
group or groups from worshipping, but by enacting an ordinance regulating the place
of worship, a municipality indirectly can achieve the same result. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized the seriousness of the indirect effect of an ordinance
regulating the location of churches: "Any restriction upon the opportunity to build a
house of worship is at least a potential burden upon the freedom of those who would
like to worship there. Whether the burden is slight or substantial will depend on the
circumstances." 15 1
145. Id. at 308.
146. See Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 738 (11th Cir. 1983) (A zoning ordinance that prohibits
churches or synagogues in residential districts "affects prayer and religious services, and so involves conduct.").
147. See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624,638 (1943) ("One's right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
submitted to vote .... ); Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 611 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting), rev'd, 319 U.S.
103 (1943) (the freedom of worship is "essential to our political welfare and spiritual progress ... ").
148. See supra text accompanying note 136. This may not always be the case. For instance, Orthodox Jews are
prohibited by their religious doctrine from travelling on the Sabbath. Consequently, their religious belief requires that the
synagogue be built within walking distance of the members' homes. See Young Israel Org. of Cleveland v. Dworkin, 105
Ohio App. 89, 92, 133 N.E.2d 174, 176 (1956).
149. See supra text accompanying note 137.
150. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
151. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Village of Bayside, 12 Wis. 2d 585, 599-600, 108 N.W.2d 288,296 (1961).
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The burden on a group's religious practice caused by a zoning ordinance might
be considered slight, for instance, if a suburban municipality allowed a congregation
to worship in existing homes, churches, schools, and meeting halls, but prohibited
the construction of new churches in residential districts. Nevertheless, these alterna-
tives, although superficially reasonable, present some difficulties. If corporate
worship' 5 ' is considered an indispensable part of the practice of a faith 153 limiting the
congregation to worship in private homes should violate the constitution if the size of
the congregation precludes home worship.' 54 Moreover, limiting worship to homes
may create the very problems that a community ostensibly tries to eliminate. Worship
in homes may require parking on the residential street and may create noise problems
since a home and its yard are not designed to alleviate noise.'
55
Forcing the congregation to use existing churches, schools, or meeting halls may
present other difficulties. These structures may not reflect the theology of a particular
faith. For example, the Catholic canon law requires that the building used for worship
be attached to other buildings for the rite of consecration and that profane uses be
prohibited from above or below the sanctuary. 156 The architecture of the churches
may also reflect the theology of most religious sects and may be considered a visual,
permanent form of worship. 157 Schools and meeting halls may be theologically
unsuitable since the nondescript atmosphere may create a message that is con-
tradictory to a particular faith's doctrine. 
8
In the same respect, requiring a congregation to use other church buildings may
pose several problems. First, the quantity of old churches in a suburban community
may be small or nonexistent if the suburban community has only recently expanded
into undeveloped land where few churches originally existed. Only new churches
152. Corporate worship is the gathering of the congregation together to worship in public to provide a center of
reference outside each member's own immediate experience. This is contrasted with worship between an individual
member and a supreme being and worship among a member's immediate family. Olsen, The Closet, the House, and the
Sanctuary, 98 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 1285 (1981).
153. See id.; see also Boyd, Contexts for Worship, 92 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 830 (1975).
154. The Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses has 175 members.
155. In Lakewood the church construction plans included off-street parking. Brief for Appellant at 7, Lakewood,
Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72
(1983).
156. J. O'CONNELL, CHURCH BUItDINo AND FINISHING: THE CHURCH'S WAY 16 (1955).
157. D. BRUGINK & C. DROPPERS, CHRIST AND ARCHrrEcTuRE 1 (1965). The symbolic importance of a church is
exemplified by the actions of the Protestants during the Reformation. The Roman Catholic churches taken over by the
Protestants were altered because of theological considerations, not aesthetic tastes. Id. at 2. The Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of this visual message: "[Tlhe church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and
shrine, and clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious symbols come to convey
theological ones." West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). These theological messages are
protected under the speech clause or the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
[Ricligious worship qua speech is not different from any other variety of protected speech as a matter of
constitutional principle [the respondents argue]. I believe that this proposition is plainly wrong. Were it right,
the Religion Clauses would be emptied of any independent meaning in circumstances in which religious practice
took the form of speech.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 284 (1981) (White, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the speech clause and the free
exercise clause overlap. For example, religious speech directed toward members of a religious sect is protected by the free
exercise clause, while religious speech directed toward the public is protected by the speech clause. See Note, Religious
Worship Held to be a Form of Protected Speech, 5 WHITTIER L. REv. 61 (1983).
158. A meeting hall or a school may be suitable to the Jehovah's Witnesses since the type of structure the
Congregation wishes to construct would be similar to a meeting hall.
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would be built to meet the expanded needs of the community. Second, if the con-
gregation is forced to rent the building, the congregation may not be able to alter the
building to conform to its religious doctrine. This is an important consideration for
the Jehovah's Witnesses, whose theology is quite different concerning the use and the
meaning of the structure.1 59 Third, unoccupied church structures in suburban com-
munities usually are vacated because the structures are too small to accommodate
new members moving into the community and, therefore, may be inadequate to
accommodate sizable congregations.
Even though schools, churches, and meeting halls in the excluded residential
areas of a suburban community may not provide suitable places for worship, the
burden on the congregation caused by the exclusion still may be slight if the
municipality allows churches to be constructed in other areas of the city. In the
Lakewood case, for instance, churches could be built by special permit in nine
percent of the city. 160 The congregation, however, asserted that even though there
were suitable parcels of land in commercial districts, the congregation financially was
unable to purchase the land. 161 The Congregation contended that this financial barrier
also prohibited the construction of a church in commercial districts. The Sixth Circuit
rejected this argument and, citing Braunfeld, stated that an indirect economic burden
does not give rise to a constitutional protection. 162 The court's position in Lakewood
nevertheless appears to be inconsistent with Sherbert, 163 and Thomas, 164 in which the
Court held that an indirect economic burden justified a religious exemption.' 65
Braunfeld did involve an economic burden, 166 but is distinguishable from Lakewood
since a strong state interest counterbalanced the statute in Braunfeld. As the Sherbert
Court stated:
The [Braunfeld] Court recognized that the Sunday closing law which that decision sus-
tained undoubtedly served "to make the practice of [the Orthodox Jewish mer-
chants'] ... religious beliefs more expensive." But the statute was nevertheless saved
by a countervailing factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case-a strong state
interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers.' 68
The Lakewood case is arguably more similar to Sherbert and Thomas than
Braunfeld, as the municipalities' stated exclusion is weak. The Sherbert and Thomas
decisions appear to indicate that the fact that a burden on religious activity is eco-
nomic is irrelevant. Consequently, an indirect economic burden may satisfy the
undue burden element of Yoder. 169
159. W. C. STEVENSON, YEAR OF DooM, 1975: THE STORY OF JEHOVAH'S WrrTNssEs 50 (1967).
160. See supra text accompanying note 18.
161. See supra text accompanying note 20.
162. Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699 F.2d 303, 307 (6th Cir.)
(citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
163. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
164. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 130 and 139.
166. In Braunfeld, the state enacted a Sunday closing law that indirectly made Orthodox Jews' religion more
expensive. The loss of one day's revenue, Braunfeld asserted, was the difference between keeping his shop open and
closing it permanently. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 (1961).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 182-92.
168. Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963) (citations omitted).
169. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729,737 (1 lth Cir. 1983) ("It is especially unclear whether Braunfeld
still creates presumptive validity for governmental actions that impose only indirect burdens. No Supreme Court case
since Braunfeld has relied on the direct/indirect rhetoric to uphold governmental action.").
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In the freedom of speech area of the first amendment, the Supreme Court has
considered the severity of the burden placed on the fundamental right of speech
through the use of zoning. 70 In Young v. American Mini Theatres, 171 the Court held
that adult theatres validly may be dispersed through a municipality's use of its zoning
power. Since the concentration of adult theatres "tends to attract an undesirable
quantity and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an in-
crease in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to
move elsewhere,"' 172 zoning is an appropriate tool to alleviate those ill effects. Three
factors behind the Young decision may be relevant to the church exclusion issue.
First, the Young Court considered the content of the speech and concluded that the
speech at issue is not accorded full protection by the constitution.' 7 3 Second, the
Young Court was impressed with the city council's findings that the ill effects of the
speech were serious' 74 and that the restriction would have the desired result of
ameliorating the ill effects. 175 Last, the restriction did not apply to a "myriad of
locations. "176
The factors that convinced the Court in Young to uphold a zoning ordinance
restricting speech should lead to the opposite result in Lakewood, especially in light
of the Young Court's dictum that "the situation would be quite different if the
ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to lawful
speech.' ' 177 First, religious activities have received full protection under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 78 Religious activities, unlike some
other forms of speech, 179 do not get partial protection under the constitution. Second,
in Lakewood the city council did not make specific findings that the existence of
churches in the community would have ill effects or that the zoning ordinance exclud-
ing churches would ameliorate any ill effects. Finally, the court did not find a
"myriad" of locations to which the ordinance did not apply, since under the Lake-
wood ordinance, construction of new churches was limited to an area representing
only ten percent of the city.
180
Further, cases subsequent to Young have reinforced the Young Court's position
that a zoning ordinance may not suppress or greatly restrict access to lawful speech.
In Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,181 the Court held that nude dancing, which
is fully protected speech, could not be excluded from a municipality. Also, several
170. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (live nude dancing); Young v. American
Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (adult movies).
171. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
172. Id. at 55.
173. Id. at 70.
174. Id. at 54.
175. Id. at 71.
176. Id. at 71 n.35.
177. Id. at 71 n.35 (1976).
178. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment See. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
179. Speaking for the majority, Justice Stevens stated,
Whether political oratory of philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise what is said, every
schoolchild can understand why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities"
exhibited in the theatres of our choice.
Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
180, See supra text accompanying note 18; see also Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d. 729, 739 (11th Cir.
1983) (the city's zoning regulations allowed "religious institutions to operate [in] one half of the City's territory.").
181. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
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lower federal courts have held that the regulation of adult theatres is unconstitutional
when the distance requirements from certain other buildings has the effect of exclud-
ing adult theatres from the community.""2 The free exercise clause similarly makes
no distinction between outright exclusion and the effect of exclusion. The Court in
Braunfeld stated a law may be declared constitutionally invalid "[i]f the purpose or
effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions .... "183 The
Lakewood ordinance's exclusion of churches from ninety percent of the community
combined with the prohibitive expense of purchasing land in unrestricted, com-
mercial districts, operated to effectively exclude churches from the city.' 84 Conse-
quently, the effect of the zoning ordinance, total exclusion from the community, may
rise to the undue burden required by Yoder.
3. The Compelling Interests of Suburban Municipalities
Under the third part of Yoder and Thomas the municipality must show that a
compelling governmental interest exists and that the regulation is the least restrictive
means to promote that interest. ' 8 5 Since Euclid, courts have deferred to municipali-
ties' zoning decisions.' 86 However, in Schad, the Supreme Court stated that "the
standard of review [in zoning cases] is determined by the nature of the right assertedly
threatened or violated rather than by the power being exercised or the specific limita-
tion imposed.' ' 187 When the right to worship is threatened, then, the burden should
shift to the municipality to show more than a substantial relationship under Euclid.
The municipality should have to show the compelling state interest required by Yoder
and Thomas.' 
88
Lakewood, like many other municipalities with similar ordinances, probably
enacted its ordinance to protect residential areas from traffic hazards, noise, a de-
crease in property values, and to create an aesthetically pleasing residential area. 189
Traffic hazards and noise relate to public health and safety, while property values and
aesthetics relate to public convenience. 
90
Health and safety19 1 are considered to be more substantial state interests than
public comfort and convenience1 92 in determining whether a state interest exists that
182. Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983) (ordinance would reduce adult uses from thirty
to twelve); Basiardanes v. City of Galveston, 682 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1982) (dispersal requirements exclude adult theatres
from 80% to 90% of the areas from which they are not already banned); Keego Harbor Co. v. City of Keego Harbor, 657
F.2d 94 (6th Cir. 1981) (every location in the municipality was within 500 feet of a regulated use like the ordinance
required).
183. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (emphasis added).
184. Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 740 (1 lth Cir. 1983) ("The Sixth Circuit [in Lakewood] faced, if
anything, a closer balance than the one called for today-as opposed to the one half of Miami Beach territory where
Appellees may conduct their religious services, the City of Lakewood permits church buildings on only around ten percent
of its land.").
185. Thomas v. Reiew Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
186. See supra text accompanying note 45.
187. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 131 & 141.
189. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
190. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part 1: The Religious Liberty
Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. Rav. 1381, 1390-1416 (1967).
191. Id. at 1390.
192. Id. at 1397.
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is compelling enough to place constraints on the constitutionally protected right of
freedom of religion. Thus, whether the community's interest in a zoning ordinance
relates more to health and safety or public convenience and comfort will determine
whether the ordinance passes constitutional muster. Aesthetic considerations argu-
ably relate more to public convenience and comfort and alone may not be enough to
justify a zoning ordinance that restricts religious practice.' 93 Justice Douglas ac-
knowledged in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas that aesthetics must give way to
constitutionally protected rights. 194 Also, protecting property values is not itself a
compelling state interest since property values are affected by the public health,
safety, convenience, or welfare. The fluctuation of property values is simply the
effect of zoning.
Noise and traffic hazards are problems that municipalities have the power to
remedy 195 since noise and traffic hazards relate to public health and safety. However,
zoning ordinances prohibiting new churches in residential districts could not eradicate
noise and traffic hazards altogether. Municipalities would be eliminating those
hazards only to the extent that they are created by members of the new church.
Hazards would remain to the extent that they are caused by individuals residing
within the district or by members of churches already located in residential districts.
Under Thomas, however, the municipality must show that exclusion from residential
areas is the least restrictive means to mitigate those hazards. Less restrictive means
than excluding churches from the community are clearly available to reduce noise and
traffic hazards. Traffic hazards could be mitigated through the use of traffic signs and
lights. 196 Also, the traffic speed could be reduced in the area, so violators, rather than
excluded congregations, could bear the cost of violation. Alternatively, a zoning
ordinance could be drawn narrowly to require that lots being used for religious
purposes have a portion set aside for adequate off-street parking.' 97 Noise levels also
could be regulated by building codes requiring soundproofing or by punishing in-
dividuals who create noise above a certain level. 198 These means to alleviate the
health and safety hazards caused by churches and their members all are less drastic
than the exclusion of churches. Not only would the alternative means mitigate the
hazards caused by churches and their members but they also would mitigate those
noise and traffic hazards that still would occur despite the exclusion of new churches.
Thus, municipalities could achieve their objectives through means that are less re-
strictive than total exclusion from residential areas.
In sum, it should be difficult for a suburban municipality to show a compelling
state interest in excluding churches from residential districts. Since the economic
burden on church groups created by zoning coupled with, as in the Lakewood case,
193. Jones, Church-State Religions: Our Constitutional Heritage, in REuGION AND CONTMPORARY SocMTY 156,
181 (H. Stahmer ed. 1963) quoted in Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part L
The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381, 1397 (1967).
194. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
195. See supra text accompanying note 67.
196. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 233 Ind. 83, 92, 117 N.E.2d 115, 120
(1954).
197. Brief for Appellant at 45, Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Lakewood, 699
F.2d 303 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 72 (1983).
198. Id. at 44.
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the exclusion of churches from ninety percent of the community, has the effect of
prohibiting congregational worship in the community, restrictive zoning ordinances
should be found to violate the free exercise clause of the first amendment. According-
ly, when the free exercise clause would be violated through restrictive zoning, the
construction of churches should be allowed in residential districts.
C. The Establishment Clause Problem
If the prohibition of new church buildings in residential districts in suburban
communities is found to violate the free exercise clause, then a court may order the
municipality to permit a congregation to construct a church building in a residential
district. This poses another first amendment problem: allowing churches in residen-
tial areas, while excluding other secular interests, may violate the establishment
clause of the first amendment.' 99
The Constitution requires that "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion. ... 200 The meaning of the establishment clause has
changed since its addition to the Constitution. Historically the establishment clause
was interpreted to permit a close and friendly relationship between church and state,
but to require that the state not prefer one religion over another.20 ' In Everson v.
Board of Education,20 2 the Supreme Court appeared to interpret the free exercise
clause to allow absolutely no aid to religious organizations. Nevertheless the Court
allowed government aid to bus schoolchildren to parochial schools because the aid
enabled parents to "get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and ex-
peditiously to and from accredited schools." 20 3 Less than five years after the Everson
decision, the Court appeared to adopt a position of "free exercise neutrality." 2 4 The
Court in Zorach v. Clausen2°5 held that a program that released students for religious
instruction at locations other than school was valid. The Court concluded that "[t]o
hold that. . . [government] . . . may not . . . [accommodate the public service to
spiritual needs] . . . would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the
government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring
those who believe in no religion over those who do believe.''206 Hence aid that
accommodates the free exercise of religion is neutral for establishment purposes.20 7
Although a legislative body implemented the incidental aid in Zorach, the Su-
preme Court also held in Sherbert208 that a judicially created religious exemption
199. See Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); see also Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652 (1981) ("Nor for present purposes do religious organizations enjoy rights to com-
municate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds superior to those of other organizations having social, political, or
other ideological messages to proselytize.").
200. U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
201. See, e.g., J. STORY, A FAMILIAR ExposrrioN OF THE CONST1r1UTION OF THE UNITED STATES 261 (1861).
202. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
203. Id. at 18.
204. KATz, RELIOION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITTI)TION 91 (1964).
205. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
206. Id. at 314.
207. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961) (Court said that a legislatively created religious
exemption to a Sunday closing law would be valid).
208. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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does not violate the establishment clause. In Sherbert, Justice Brennan stated that
"the extension of unemployment benefits ... reflects nothing more than the gov-
ernmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences." 2 0 9 In his
concurrence, Justice Stewart vigorously objected to Justice Brennan's seemingly
simple resolution of the conflict between the free exercise clause and the establish-
ment clause. 210 Justice Stewart suggested that the Court's expansive interpretation of
the establishment clause requires that "government must blind itself to the differing
religious beliefs and traditions of the people.' '21 The Sherbert decision, Justice
Stewart concluded, created a preference for an exemption on a religious ground over
an exemption on a secular ground and was contrary to the holding in Abington
Township v. Schempp.21 2 In Schempp, the Court held that a legislative enactment
requiring that either the Bible be read or the Lord's Prayer be recited was a violation
of the establishment clause.2 13 The Court found that the purpose and effect of the law
was to advance religion even though the program was voluntary and the state alleged
several secular purposes for the legislation.
The Schempp decision, other decisions by the Supreme Court,21 4 Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion in Sherbert, and Justice Stewart's concurrence in Sherbert
display the disagreement among the Justices and the inconsistencies among decisions
about the meaning of the establishment clause. Moreover, this disagreement has
continued in recent decisions. In Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment
Security Division,215 the Court, relying on'Sherbert, held that a religious exemption
from the unemployment compensation system did not violate the establishment
clause. During the same term, however, in Heffron v. International Society for
Krishna Consciousness2 16 the Court suggested that religious organizations have no
preference to solicit on fairgrounds over other secular organizations.
Although this divergence of opinion continues, most commentators who have
followed the conflict agree that the establishment clause protects certain core val-
ues. 217 The first value protected by the establishment clause is "religious
voluntarism,"218 or the freedom to choose among the various creeds and faiths. 2 19
This concept also is implicit in the free exercise clause, which provides for freedom
of religious belief and the right to engage in religious activity that is not coerced by
the state. Since a religious organization will prosper and develop only if it has the
voluntary support of its members, voluntary association will lead to competition
209. Id. at 409.
210. Id. at 413.
211. Id. at 416.
212. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
213. Id. at 223.
214. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (government cannot "constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against nonbelievers ...."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
441-42 (1961) ("the First Amendment... did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a church; it forbade
all laws respecting an establishment of religion.") (emphasis in original).
215. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
216. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
217. See generally Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development Part II. The
Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REv. 513 (1968).
218. Id. at 517.
219. Id.
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among these organizations. Competition, in turn, will strengthen religion and society
by forcing religious organizations to succeed on their own, intrinsic merits. This
process distills excellence, which again produces benefits for society. 220 The second
value protected by the establishment clause, political noninvolvement, 22 1 is needed to
ensure free competition among religious sects. Insulation from the political processes
will promote free competition among religious organizations and thus produce bene-
ficial results for society. The establishment clause promotes these values by requiring
government to remain a neutral observer in this process.
These values may be applied to religious uses of land. For instance, if govern-
ment would provide aid solely to a religious organization for the purchase of land
when land use is regulated solely by the marketplace, neither value is promoted.
Religious voluntarism is not promoted because a religious organization no longer is
succeeding on its own intrinsic merit. Furthermore, political noninvolvement is not
promoted since government has hindered the free competition among religious orga-
nizations by providing aid for purchases of land.
Today local governments have increased the amount of regulation in society to
promote the general welfare of the citizens. One method of regulation adopted to
benefit society is zoning. Residential users are favored because the hazards and
annoyances of commercial and industrial uses are relegated to another part of
town. 222 Commercial users are benefited because the concentration of commercial
uses will attract potential customers to one area and, to the advantage of customers,
will make the competition among users more visible. 22 3 Industrial users also are
benefited because utilities and transportation facilities can be centrally located at
reduced costs. 224 Thus, government involvement in land-use regulation provides
benefits to society.
Although traditional establishment notions require that government abstain from
aiding religious organizations, the increased land-use regulation has caused tradition-
al establishment notions to be applicable no longer. Previously, religious uses of land
were not disfavored. Currently, however, zoning officials are given power to de-
termine what value is to be given to religious property uses. 2" By restricting the
property available for religious uses in suburban communities, zoning officials se-
verely disadvantage religious organizations by forcing them to compete with com-
mercial users for land at higher prices.22 6 This does not promote the values the
establishment clause is meant to protect.227 Government involvement has prohibited
new religious organizations from building a place of worship, while other religious
organizations and secular organizations already existing at the time of the prohibition
of new churches in residential districts are permitted to continue under the preexist-
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 2 R. ANDERSON, supra note 3, § 9.24.
223. Id. § 9.38.
224. Id. § 9.40.
225. Giannella, supra note 217, at 538-39.
226. See supra text accompanying note 20.
227. Giannella, supra note 217, at 538-41.
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ing, nonconforming use doctrine. 228 The value of religious voluntarism is un-
dermined because of the increased political involvement. Consequently, the free
competition of religions is suppressed.
Since any governmental attempt to avoid benefiting religious organizations
would not promote the values protected by the establishment clause in the zoning
context, a more preferable result would be to adopt a course that would promote
religious voluntarism and political noninvolvement. Inclusion of churches in residen-
tial districts would allow religious organizations to enjoy the benefits accruing to
existing religious organizations and the rest of the community. Since the benefit to
religious organizations would be on par with benefits accorded other interest groups,
government involvement would be neutralized, and the value of political non-
involvement would be promoted. Likewise, religious voluntarism would be promoted
since there would not be governmental interference and favoritism among different
religious sects. A court order permitting the construction of a church in a residential
district in Lakewood situations thus would not violate the establishment clause22 9
because the order would promote the values underlying the establishment clause.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the development of surburban communities, zoning has had a unique
effect on the market for land available for religious uses. The use of zoning to
prohibit the construction of churches in residential districts creates shortages of land
for the construction of churches in residential districts, while limiting the supply in
commercial districts. The effect of this is to deny religious groups, especially
minorities, the right to worship within the community. In those situations, judicial
activism is necessary to assure religious freedom. A judicial order requiring a build-
ing permit to be issued in a residential district would not violate the establishment
clause, since the governmental aid would effectuate the values underlying the es-
tablishment clause. Consequently, a religious exemption to a zoning ordinance is an
appropriate remedy to secure the right to the free exercise of religion.
Thomas S. Counts
228. The doctrine allows the continuance of uses begun prior to the enactment of a zoning ordinance prohibiting that
use even though the use does not conform to the requirements of the enactment. I P. ROHAN, ZONtNG AND LAND USE
CONTRoLS, § 1.02 [5][b][iv] (1983).
229. The Schempp decision is not necessarily inconsistent with this result. Schempp requires that a legislative act
may neither advance nor aid religion, nor oppose or inhibit religion. Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226
(1963). The Schempp Court expressly left open the question whether the lack of governmental aid, neutral for establish-
ment clause purposes, would violate the free exercise clause. Id. at 226 n. 10.
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